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Capturing human values such as fairness, privacy, and justice in software systems is challenging. Values 
are abstract and may be contested, or at least viewed differently by different stakeholders, meaning they 
resist both definition and the concrete specification necessary to build machines or engineered systems. 
Choices in designing systems to embody values are political, and implicate structures beyond the system 
in question, trading off benefits and costs for different stakeholders. But this does not place computer 
systems beyond governance: the creators, operators, and controllers of such systems can and must be 
held accountable for the outcomes their systems effect. Accountability consists of a relationship focused 
on answerability: one agent or entity is accountable to another for certain outcomes in certain contexts. 
Operationalizing that accountability relationship requires keeping records – accounts – of how systems 
operated and were created. The entity to which an agent is held accountable can then determine 
responsibility, assigning praise or blame for the relevant outcomes and allocating consequences, 
ascribing moral valence to the agent’s actions and the resultant outcomes. Most abstractly, judgements 
about responsibility can serve to establish the fidelity of system behaviors to operative social, political, 
legal, and moral norms. Accountability is the best framework for considering the governance of values in 
computer systems, providing a concrete and achievable approach to engaging abstract questions around 
values and ideals. 
 
Thirty-seven seconds after the launch of the first Ariane 5 rocket on 4 June 1996, a software 
subroutine crashed, starting a chain reaction that led the launch vehicle to self-destruct. When the 
software attempted to convert a 64-bit floating point number to a 16-bit unsigned integer, the 
too-large value of the former could not be represented in the smaller format of the latter, 
triggering an unhandled error condition. Fortunately, this was a “hot standby”, meant to take 
over in the event the active copy of the software failed. Unfortunately, the active copy was 
running the same computation and therefore also crashed almost immediately after. The buggy 
subroutine existed to keep the rocket balanced while on the ground and was unnecessary after 
liftoff, but had been left running beyond in case the launch was delayed momentarily. Cascading 
failures continued as the entire inertial reference subsystem crashed, causing incorrect data to 
feed into the rocket’s guidance software. To correct what the guidance software erroneously 
understood as a deviation from the rocket’s planned trajectory, but which was in fact bad data, 
the rocket’s software control ordered the guidance nozzles on the main engine and the boosters 
to maximum deflection. This caused the rocket to veer wildly off course and experience “high 
aerodynamic loads”, which tore the boosters off the main rocket, (correctly) triggering the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3608468
rocket’s self-destruct mechanism.1 The result of this disaster was the complete loss of the launch 
vehicle and the onboard Cluster atmospheric research satellites, totaling about $370 million in 
direct losses. The failure set back the European Space Agency’s efforts to develop its next-
generation launch vehicle by several years, which to that point had run for 10 years at a cost 
equivalent to over US$7 billion. 
 
Yet despite the proximate cause of the accident being a failure in the rocket’s software, the 
inquiry board convened to analyze the accident recommended spreading responsibility across 
several functions in the development, design, and implementation of the launcher, saying that 
“When taking this design decision, it was not analysed or fully understood” meaning the 
“possible implications of allowing [the software] to continue to function [after liftoff] […] were 
not realized”. The natural human instinct in the face of such failure is to identify the cause, 
assign responsibility for that cause to a person or group of people, and to tie that responsibility to 
consequences – in other words, to hold someone accountable for the failure. But after the Ariane 
5 Flight 501 total launch failure, no individual, nor any part of the development team, was held 
directly responsible. Responsibility fell partially on several functions within the program – 
programmers, designers, requirements engineers, test engineers, and project managers – many of 
which could have exposed the failure ahead of time, but none of which did because each function 
focused on their chosen framing of their part of the project.2 Along with other high-profile early 
software failures such as Therac-25,3 the Ariane 5 failure contributed to decades of reflection in 
the software community about what is necessary to make software systems reliable in critical 
applications.4 
 
Such reflection must also be applied to artificial intelligence (AI), a term which here refers to 
any behavior embodied in a machine (usually, a software system) which a human would consider 
intelligent. Concerns that such systems might not be reliable have led to calls for greater 
governance, especially as software systems have taken over an increasing number of critical 
application domains in modern society. Often, such automation augments traditional human 
decision-makers and professionals; sometimes, it outright replaces social and economic 
structures formerly mediated by humans with new structures mediated by software-driven 
 
* Affiliation provided for professional identification purposes only. The views expressed in this chapter are those of 
the author and do not reflect official positions of the United States Government or its Department of Defense. The 
author is grateful to helpful comments from and discussions with Deirdre Mulligan, Emmanuel Moss, Abigail Z. 
Jacobs, Andrew Smart and Peter J. Denning. © 2020 Joshua A. Kroll. This chapter is available for reuse under the 
Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial Share-Alike 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0), 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. The required attribution notice under the license must include the 
chapter’s full citation information, e.g., “Kroll, Joshua A. ‘Accountability in Computer Systems’ in Oxford 
Handbook of the Ethics of AI. Dubber, Markus D., Frank Pasquale, and Sunit Das, Eds. Oxford University Press. 
2020.” 
1 Lions, Jacques-Louis, Lennart Luebeck, Jean-Luc Fauquembergue, Gilles Kahn, Wolfgang Kubbat, Stefan 
Levedag, Leonardo Mazzini, Didier Merle, and Colin O’Halloran. “Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure: Report by the 
Inquiry Board.” (1996). 
2 Dowson, Mark. “The Ariane 5 software failure.” ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes 22, no. 2 (1997): 84. 
3 Leveson, Nancy G., and Clark S. Turner. “An investigation of the Therac-25 accidents.” Computer 26, no. 7 
(1993): 18-41. 
4 These issues are by no means software-specific, but extend to all engineering in safety-critical contexts. See, e.g., 
Vaughan, Diane. The Challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA. University of 
Chicago Press, 1996 or Leveson, Nancy G. Engineering a safer world. The MIT Press, 2016. 
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machines.5 This chapter of the Oxford Handbook of Ethics of Artificial Intelligence examines the 
relationship between such AI systems and the concept of accountability. 
Definitions and the Unit of Analysis 
To understand accountability in the context of AI systems, we must begin by examining the 
various ways the term is used and the variety of concepts to which it is meant to refer. Further, 
we must examine the unit of analysis, or the level of abstraction at which we consider the term to 
apply.6 As with many terms used in the discussion of AI, different stakeholders have 
fundamentally different and even incompatible ideas of what concept they are referring to, 
especially when they come from different disciplinary backgrounds.7 This confusion leads to 
disagreement and debate in which parties disagree not on substance, but on the subject of debate 
itself. Here, we provide a brief overview of concepts designated by the term “accountability”, 
covering their relationships, commonalities, and divergences in the service of bridging such 
divides.8 
 
Artifacts, Systems, and Structures: Where does accountability lie? 
Accountability is generally conceptualized with respect to some entity – a relationship that 
involves reporting of information to that entity and in exchange receiving praise, disapproval, or 
consequences when appropriate. Successfully demanding accountability around an entity, 
person, system, or artifact requires establishing both ends of this relationship: who or what 
answers to whom or to what? 
 
Additionally, to understand a discussion of or call for accountability in an AI system or 
application, it is critical to determine what things the system must answer for, that is, the 
information exchanged. There are many ways to ground a demand for answerability and give it 
normative force, and commensurately many types of accountability: moral, administrative, 
political, managerial, market, legal & judicial, relative to constituent desires, and professional.9 
AI systems intersect with all eight types of accountability, each in different ways and depending 
on the specifics of the application context. 
 
Beyond the question of the normative backing for accountability is the question of to what unit it 
is applied: are we considering a single component, a larger system, or the entire structure of 
society in determining how accountability will be operationalized? Such unit of analysis 
 
5 Kroll, Joshua A., Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson, and Harlan Yu. 
“Accountable algorithms.” U. Pa. L. Rev. 165 (2016): 633. 
6 Selbst et al. refer to failures to understand the appropriate unit of analysis as “abstraction error” and define five 
“traps” representing common pitfalls in problem framing. See Selbst, Andrew D., danah boyd, Sorelle A. Friedler, 
Suresh Venkatasubramanian, and Janet Vertesi. “Fairness and abstraction in sociotechnical systems.” Proceedings of 
the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp. 59-68. ACM, 2019. 
7 Deirdre Mulligan, Kroll, Joshua A., Nitin Kohli, and Richmond Wong, “This thing called ‘fairness’: Disciplinary 
confusion realizing a value in technology.” Proceedings of the Computer Supported Cooperative Work Conference. 
(2019) 
8 An alternative but similar taxonomy is presented in Wieringa, Maranke. “What to account for when accounting for 
algorithms: a systematic literature review on algorithmic accountability”. In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on 
Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* ’20). 2020. Association for Computing Machinery, New York, 
NY, USA, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372833 
9 This taxonomy is due to Jabbra, Joseph G., and Onkar Prasad Dwivedi. Public service accountability: A 
comparative perspective. Kumarian Press, 1988. 
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questions apply both to determining what we are holding accountable and what we are holding it 
accountable to.10 For example, in considering a system that predicts credit risk, we might choose 
to examine the instrument itself (i.e., it adequately reflects the borrower’s risk of default), the 
larger sociotechnical context including applicants and loan officers (i.e., it functions adequately 
in the administration of lending, comports with actors’ understanding of how it should behave, 
and is not subject to gaming), or the overall structure of credit analysis and lending (i.e., it does 
not systematically undermine credit markets or the provisioning or distribution of goods and 
services and does not unduly discriminate against structurally subordinated groups). Similarly, 
we may wish to hold it accountable to standards at a variety of levels of abstraction: 
instrumentally, we may demand that the score is correct if and only if it adequately rates risk or 
rates risk in an equal way across demographic groups, holding the system’s performance to an 
objective and mathematical standard of correctness; at a systems level, we might hold the score 
to a standard of defensibility in litigation or another oversight mechanism; at a societal level, we 
might ask whether the distribution of risk elucidated by the score is the correct and morally 
appropriate distribution, a standard of fidelity to normative goals. Determining the extent to 
which each of these standards is met requires different approaches based on the level of analysis 
by different actors: correctness relates to technical decisions about a system’s design; oversight 
implicates a specific entity or policy in receiving and examining answers about how a system 
behaved; normative fidelity is constructed through social and political processes, and often 
systems affect the operative norms just as much as they are constrained. Correctness, here, has 
two meanings: fidelity to a specification (the usual meaning in engineering) and consonance with 
normative context. That is: does a system follows the rules we have laid out for it? And are those 
rules the right rules? 
 
Often, the unit of analysis referenced by someone discussing accountability relates to their 
disciplinary training and orientation: those interested in technology development, design, and 
analysis are more likely to conceptualize the system-as-embodied, situating algorithms and the 
agency of AI systems within machines themselves, or with their designers (i.e., technologists 
focus on the computers, the software, and the interfaces, or the engineering process). Political, 
social, and legal demands for accountability often focus around higher-order units such as 
sociotechnical systems of artifacts interacting with people or entire paradigms of social 
organization (i.e., policy discussions are often focused on systemwide outcomes or the fidelity of 
systems to democratically determined goals, looking at the company or agency involved and 
operative policy rather than the specific tools in use or their performance characteristics). Often, 
all units of analysis inform appropriate interventions supporting accountability, as the 
information necessary to establish system-level accountability may depend on metrics and 
measures established at the technical level. Thus, accountability must be part of the design at 
every scale, in tandem. 
 
Related to the unit of analysis question is the issue of causal and moral responsibility. When 
operationalizing accountability, it is important that the relationship of answerability corresponds 
either to its subject causing the condition for which it is answerable or to its being morally 
culpable for that condition. If no such link exists, or if the information conveyed via the 
accountability relationship does not establish the link, then it is difficult to find the actor 
 
10 Bijker, Wiebe E., Thomas Parke Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds. The social construction of technological 
systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology. MIT Press, 1989. 
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accountable. Operationalizing accountability in AI systems requires developing ways to make 
such links explicit and communicable. For example, the scapegoating of a component or portion 
of the problem can impair agency of the involved actors in establishing fault. Additionally, the 
problem of many hands can serve as a barrier to accountability, as it did in the Ariane 5 Flight 
501 failure.11 While many hands were responsible for that failure, this need not be the case: 
alternative governance structures for such multifaceted, cross-functional development teams 
could explicitly make leaders responsible, providing an incentive for them to ensure adequate 
performance and the avoidance of failures across their organization, or use other mechanisms to 
make domains of answerability clear at the level of functions or organizations. For example, 
legal proceedings often hold organizations (say, corporations) accountable at an abstract level, 
leaving the determination of individual accountability to happen inside the organization.12 But 
these as well can be their own sort of scapegoating – accidents in autonomous systems are often 
blamed on “human error” even when the human has little meaningful control over what the 
system is doing.13 
 
Accountability, Oversight, and Review 
If we conceptualize accountability as answerability of various kinds, and we understand who 
must answer, for what, and to whom the answers are intended, then we have redeveloped the 
concept of oversight, a component of governance where a designated authority holds special 
power to review evidence of activities and to connect them to consequences. Oversight 
complements regulatory methods in governance, allowing for checks and controls on a process 
even when the correct behavior of that process cannot be specified in advance as a rule. Rather, 
an oversight entity can observe the actions and behaviors of the process and separate the 
acceptable ones from the unacceptable ones ex post. Further, when rules exist, an oversight entity 
can verify that the process acted consistently within them. Even when guidance is expressed in 
standards or principles, oversight can apply those more abstract desiderata in a given case, 
weighing considerations against each other given scenario-specific facts and circumstances. 
 
In computer science, and in engineering generally, the twin modalities of guaranteeing 
compliance with a formally stated policy ex ante and keeping records which provide for auditing 
ex post have long been recognized as the major approaches to understanding the fidelity of an 
artifact to goals such as correctness, security, and privacy.14 However, the dominant modality – 
whether building software and hardware controllers; rockets and aircraft; or bridges and 
buildings – has been to decide on a rule up front, to express this rule as a set of requirements for 
the system, to implement the system so that it is faithful to those requirements, and to verify that 
the implementation comports with the requirements while also validating that the requirements 
 
11 Nissenbaum, Helen. “Accountability in a computerized society.” Science and engineering ethics 2, no. 1 (1996): 
25-42. In the Ariane 5 case, an inability to hold an individual or specific function accountable is not necessarily a 
failure – the European Space Agency was certainly responsible for the incident and able to lay blame on the entire 
development organization in ways that significantly changed engineering practices. 
12 A barrier to accountability specific to AI systems in this sense is that liability for software products is often 
disclaimed by vendors and is in any case difficult to establish in product safety law. For an overview, see Choi, 
Bryan H. "Crashworthy code." Wash. L. Rev. 94 (2019): 39. 
13 Elish, Madeleine Clare. "Moral crumple zones: Cautionary tales in human-robot interaction." Engaging Science, 
Technology, and Society 5 (2019): 40-60. 
14 Weitzner, Daniel J., Harold Abelson, Tim Berners-Lee, Joan Feigenbaum, James Hendler, and Gerald Jay 
Sussman. “Information accountability.” Communications of the ACM 51, no. 6 (2008): 82. 
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capture the desired high-level goals. In this way, conformance of the artifact to a rule can be 
known ahead of time. Such an approach is quite powerful, and is often highly desirable (for 
example, we wish to know that a bridge will support a certain weight across a span before 
materials are expended in its construction). However, it is insufficient where the rules are 
exceedingly complex, contested, or require interpretation in order to be enforced, features of 
domains where AI systems are most desirable. Such domains include the application of many 
laws stated as principles, including data protection rules (e.g., determining whether consent is 
“informed”), copyright (e.g., establishing whether copying constitutes fair use), the use of 
protected data by law enforcement or for intelligence activities (e.g., granting orders allowing 
investigators access to protected information), and situations where there exist concerns about 
fairness, bias, or nondiscrimination.15 Even in the many common cases where laws are expressed 
as standards or duties of care, there can be “best practices” that are amenable to implementation, 
but the many data breaches of organizations which have been certified to comply with such best 
practices attest to the fact that such practices often do not speak to the equities at stake. Further, 
the practical enforcement of laws could be described as the process of managing exceptions 
without risking the rule. 
 
Further, AI is often employed in domains where specifying what rule should apply is difficult, 
and so the precise contours of the rule are left up to the system. For example, it would be 
prohibitively difficult to define a rule deductively for identifying objects in images (however, 
this approach has been a focus of many decades of AI research), though methods which use 
pattern extraction from large volumes of annotated data have recently proved useful and 
achievable. Such pattern extraction methods are particularly ill suited to applications where 
interpretation is required. But when the details of a rule are deferred to the operation of an AI 
system, the rule escapes even the basic level of scrutiny, verification, or validation present when 
rules are carefully constructed by engineers and policymakers. Further, because the rule is not set 
ex ante, it is difficult to disclose the rule or assess whether it meets operative normative 
guidance. 
 
Enabling governance beyond setting rules is critical, as many contexts resist formalization as 
concrete rules. The proper operationalization of certain value-sensitive concepts, such as 
fairness, may be contested among stakeholders. Achieving political consensus in such cases may 
require intentional vagueness or deferral of authority to a designated entity (for example, 
legislatures generally defer the specifics of rulemaking to regulatory authorities, who may be 
more knowledgeable and better able to react to changing circumstances, and both also defer the 
specifics of administering the law in particular cases to courts and judges, who can balance 
values which are in tension and who can review cases with more certainty as to what happened 
as their view is retrospective, not prospective). Again, because AI systems defer the details of 
shaping rules into the operation of the system, they sidestep these balancing, refinement, and 
consensus-building processes, which are critical to develop a system’s legitimacy. 
 
 
15 Weitzner, Daniel J., Harold Abelson, Tim Berners-Lee, Joan Feigenbaum, James Hendler, and Gerald Jay 
Sussman. “Information accountability.” MIT Technical Report MIT-CSAIL-TR-2007-034. June 13, 2007. 
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Beyond this, some concepts may be essentially contested,16 meaning that while stakeholders 
agree on the broad outlines of the concept in question, inherent in that agreement is a 
disagreement about the correct way to realize it in the world. Fairness is an excellent example – 
although many (or all) stakeholders in a particular context may wish an AI system to behave 
fairly, what is fair for some may not be fair for others. Setting out rules for what constitutes 
fairness must, of its nature, set these stakeholders in tension with each other. Privacy has also 
been described as an essentially contested concept.17 Accountability provides a framework for 
reorienting this problem: stakeholders may be able to agree on a process or mechanism for 
weighing countervailing concerns in particular cases even when they cannot agree on the proper 
operationalization of acceptable vs. unacceptable behavior for a system up front. That is, 
acknowledging that definitions may not be possible, a case-by-case process for resolution may 
serve the operative value well enough in practice for the purpose of all stakeholders. Further, 
deferring enforcement can make space for the interpretive nature of goals expressed as standards 
or principles, rather than via the mechanical operation of a rule. 
 
As oversight is critical to operationalizing accountability in practice, building AI systems which 
facilitate accountability (to some entity, for some property) necessitates designing those systems 
to support robust oversight. This implies establishing evidence of how they were created and 
how they are operating, enabling the job of the overseer.18 In this way, accountability is tied 
directly to the maintenance of records (though records alone do not provide accountability and 
other requirements may be present). The job of the oversight entity can be characterized as 
applying appropriate norms from the context of the AI system’s deployment to tie the actions 
described in those records to consequences. Oversight is of particular importance for AI systems, 
as it bridges the gap between engineering capacity to model values and governance goals and the 
substantive requirements of those goals. In particular, oversight can establish the regularity of 
agreed-upon procedures even when the substance served by those procedures is subject to 
disagreement among stakeholders. 
 
Accountability as Accounting, Recordkeeping, and Verifiability 
The simplest definition of accountability is in terms of accounting, that is, keeping records of 
what a system did so that those actions can be reviewed later. It is important that such records be 
faithful recordings of actual behaviors, to support the reproducibility of such behaviors and their 
analysis. Additionally, such records must have their integrity maintained from the time they are 
created until the time they must be reviewed, so that the review process reliably examines (and 
can be seen by others to examine) faithful records that describe what they purport to describe. 
Finally, it is important that both the fidelity and the integrity of the records be evident both to the 
overseer and anyone who relies on the overseer’s judgements. Oversight in which the entity 
being reviewed can falsely demonstrate compliance is no oversight at all. 
 
 
16 Gallie, Walter Bryce. “Essentially contested concepts.” In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 56, pp. 
167-198. Aristotelian Society, Wiley, 1955. 
17 Mulligan, Deirdre K., Colin Koopman, and Nick Doty. “Privacy is an essentially contested concept: a multi-
dimensional analytic for mapping privacy.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, 
Physical and Engineering Sciences 374, no. 2083 (2016): 20160118. 
18 Kroll, Joshua A. “The fallacy of inscrutability.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, 
Physical and Engineering Sciences 376, no. 2133 (2018): 20180084. 
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In some cases, the causes of behaviors can be “black-boxed” – ignored for the purposes of 
recordkeeping. This is the case, for example, with human bureaucracies. We cannot demand a 
full causal explanation for the behaviors and opinions of the human functionaries in such a 
structure. Even if we could, an explication of their behavior in terms of neuronal activations and 
connections would be so complex as to be meaningless, providing little in the way of epistemic 
grounding for the outcome of the bureaucratic process. Instead, such processes develop 
explanations and justifications which are appropriately selective and contrastive, describing what 
needs to be known to the correct people at a useful level of abstraction.19 Thus, determining 
where and how to keep records of AI system behaviors is an important design consideration. The 
best way to determine which records best support accountability is to determine what oversight is 
necessary and to determine how to facilitate that oversight. Additionally, records are often useful 
directly for the subjects of decisions by AI systems or the public at large. When this is the case, 
the system design should also involve questions of how to develop direct accountability to 
subjects or the public, rather than accountability which is intermediated through political trust in 
an oversight entity. 
 
Recordkeeping is a common operationalization of accountability in Computer Science and other 
technology-oriented fields.20 Feigenbaum et al. provide a survey, taxonomizing recordkeeping 
along the dimensions of time and goals (when are records kept? What sorts of violations of 
policy do records aim to capture?), information (what information is learned about policy 
violations and policy violators?), and action (what, if any, actions are taken based on records of 
policy violations?).21 This approach views accountability with respect to a concretely defined 
policy and violations of that policy. Some authors go as far as to define accountability as the 
property that any policy violation can be attributed to the violator in a way that allows the 
assignment of blame. However, as we have seen in the concept of oversight, accountability need 
not depend on the existence of a prespecified, concrete policy – it may also operate by 
synthesizing a policy extensionally ex post (i.e., based on the analysis of particular cases). 
Additionally, the existence of records does not immediately imply that a system is truly 
answerable for its behaviors or for outcomes caused by those behaviors. Records which are 
ignored, unseen, or simply not acted upon do little to facilitate accountability. We must expand 
the concept of accountability to tie the content of the records to the broader principle of 
responsibility. 
 
Accountability as Responsibility 
Answerability includes not just the notion that answers exist, but that individuals or 
organizations can be made to answer for outcomes of their behavior or of the behavior of tools 
they make use of. Responsibility ties actions or outcomes to consequences. Authors in this space 
have identified three major normative bases for this connection: causality, fault, and duty – either 
the actions of the entity being held accountable caused the outcome being considered, or the 
entity is somehow culpable for the outcome irrespective of cause, or the entity is ascribed an 
 
19 Miller, Tim. “Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences.” Artificial Intelligence 
(2018). 
20 Espeland, Wendy Nelson, and Berit Irene Vannebo. “Accountability, quantification, and law.” Annu. Rev. Law 
Soc. Sci. 3 (2007): 21-43. 
21 Feigenbaum, Joan, Aaron D. Jaggard, Rebecca N. Wright, and Hongda Xiao. “Systematizing ‘accountability’ in 
computer science.” Technical Report YALEU/DCS/TRE1452, Yale University (2012). 
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obligation to certain behaviors. All three types of responsibility, and the relationship of any to 
accountability, are subtle and bear unpacking. Operationalizing any one or all three to make 
practical the necessary accountability mechanisms and regimes is the subject of much work 
across several disciplines. 
 
The notion of causality is itself a complicated question with a rich history of inquiry in the form 
of metaphysics; we leave this history aside here. However, the dominance of the scientific 
approach to understanding causation in the development of technical artifacts and especially AI 
systems is relevant to our inquiry.22 Because scientific approaches look to full, mechanistic 
explanations and experimentally validated knowledge to establish facts, they can struggle to 
establish the causes of some phenomena or to distinguish causal relationships from other 
relationships. For example, in situations where variables are confounded, it can be challenging to 
establish whether a measured effect is causal or illusory.23 Confounding occurs when multiple 
factors correlate with a certain outcome, and there is confusion over which associations represent 
the cause, limiting the extent to which any one can be assigned responsibility. In building a 
machine learning system for predicting mortality risk in pneumonia patients, researchers 
discovered that patients previously diagnosed with asthma performed better as a group, and as a 
result models rated them at a lower risk of near-term death. Domain experts (doctors) disagreed, 
noting that asthma patients have much higher fatality risk from pneumonia than patients without 
an asthma diagnosis. The problem lay in a quirk of the training data: by hospital rule, patients 
diagnosed with pneumonia and previously diagnosed with asthma were automatically admitted 
to intensive care, giving that cohort more aggressive treatment and more careful monitoring, 
leading to better outcomes and confusing the statistical models.24  
 
Further, events often have multiple causes and reasoning about an appropriate set of causes for 
an event is challenging. Modern mechanisms for reasoning mathematically about causality 
generally only reason about simple causation or causation in the context of controlled 
experiments (which are often not possible for questions of interest), leading to a situation where 
inferences about causality formalisms tell only a portion of the story.25 Causal analysis often 
proceeds by reasoning about counterfactuals, claims about the state of the world that would have 
resulted if some event did not occur, if some new event did occur, or if some observable feature 
of the world were different. In the context of reasoning about accountability in AI systems, 
counterfactuals present an interesting difficulty: when we consider how a system might have 
behaved in a hypothetical world different from the one we inhabit, we must understand the 
relationship between these worlds to interpret the counterfactual. The simplest sort of 
counterfactual merely introduces or removes a putative cause. In practice, the situations about 
which we wish to reason can involve complicated interactions or implicate existing social 
structures, configuring the hypothetical counterfactual world in a way that is very unlikely from 
the perspective of our world. For example, simply changing an individual’s race or gender while 
holding other attributes the same is unlikely to produce a counterfactual case that can be 
 
22 Bunge, Mario. Causality and modern science. Routledge, 2017. 
23 Momin Malik. “A Hierarchy of Limitations in Machine Learning”. Preprint. arXiv: 2002.05193. 
https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.05193 
24 Caruana, Rich, Yin Lou, Johannes Gehrke, Paul Koch, Marc Sturm, and Noemie Elhadad. “Intelligible models for 
healthcare: Predicting pneumonia risk and hospital 30-day readmission.” In Proceedings of the 21th ACM SIGKDD 
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pp. 1721-1730. ACM, 2015. 
25 Pearl, Judea. Causality. Cambridge university press, 2009. 
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analyzed in a sensible manner.26 Concepts such as race and gender are co-constructed of a 
number of factors, and it can be challenging to find meaning in shifting the experience of a given 
subject so radically. 
 
Still, causal responsibility is a key component of accountability for the simple reason that, if a 
system is to answer for its behavior, it is important to understand the causal origins of that 
behavior when possible. However, understanding the mechanisms of causation does not answer 
the question of why those mechanisms function in those ways, leading to the question of fault or 
moral responsibility. As in the dichotomy for correctness mentioned above, we can ask both 
what the mechanism of a decision was and, separately and normatively, whether that mechanism 
is the right mechanism that comports with social, political, and legal context and with values 
such as fairness and justice. Moral responsibility ascribes moral valence to both actions and 
responses to those actions, such as praise for conforming to an operative norm, or blame for 
violating it. This valence can be inherited from moral judgements about the operative norm itself, 
as well. Over and above causal responsibility, moral responsibility requires agency, or the ability 
to have behaved differently in a situation where control of the operative outcome could have 
been effected. For example, moral blame requires both that an entity is causally related to the 
event to which a moral ascription is being made and that the entity’s actions were in some way 
faulty (that is, that different actions would in a moral sense have been better). Since Aristotle, 
philosophers have judged the appropriateness of moral blame by making moral judgements 
based on traits of relevant agents, explicitly vesting moral responsibility in the voluntary nature 
of a moral agent’s control over its actions.27 
 
This notion of agency raises an important sidebar about responsibility: the agents which can be 
held responsible are exactly those with sufficient agency to be ascribed causal responsibility, 
moral responsibility, or duties and obligations. In general, this implies that, while the objects of 
recordkeeping and accountability are generally machines, software, or algorithms, the entity 
being held answerable – the subject of accountability – must be a moral agent worthy of the 
ascription of responsibility. The ability to be assigned responsibility is, in key ways, tied to moral 
“personhood”. Such personhood can vest with constructed persons – corporate and socially 
constructed entities – as well as with natural persons. The nature of holding constructed persons 
accountable is different to holding natural persons responsible as responsibility can lead to 
punishment for natural persons in much more direct ways than it can for constructed persons. 
 
A concept tightly bound to responsibility and yet distinct from it is liability, the (often legal) 
ascription of responsibility for the plight of the victim in a particular scenario. Unlike 
accountability, which is a relational concept about responsibility in the sense of answerability for 
an action, liability is analyzed from the perspective of a debt owed to someone who has suffered 
 
26 An excellent overview of counterfactual reasoning as it applies to AI systems can be found in Miller, Tim. 
“Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences.” Artificial Intelligence (2018). A more 
detailed version of the argument against counterfactual reasoning about constructed attributes can be found in 
Kohler-Hausmann, Issa. “Eddie Murphy and the dangers of counterfactual causal thinking about detecting racial 
discrimination.” Northwestern U. Law Rev. 113(5), 2019. 
27 Eshleman, Andrew, "Moral Responsibility", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
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harm.28 Liability underscores the third category of responsibility, that of duty or obligation. 
Obligations may exist outside of answerability relationships. For example, a judge could be said 
to be responsible (in the sense of having a duty) for instructing a jury prior to their deliberations, 
but because that responsibility does not cause the judge to answer to a specific entity, we would 
not say that the judge is accountable for this (however, the judge could be accountable to higher 
courts, to voters directly, to competent representative bodies with authority to impeach, or via 
challenges to court procedure for failing to uphold this duty). Liability is not a substitute for 
accountability, although it can help to enforce or encourage accountability or to reify an agent’s 
duties to encourage that agent to act or remain answerable for outcomes related to that agent’s 
actions by assigning a financial cost to breaches of duties. Treating liability as a substitute for 
accountability leads to imperfect assessments of both. For example, in the Ariane 5 case, many 
different functions worked on the project and many people in each of those functions, obscuring 
lines of accountability. Yet the European Space Agency was very clearly liable for the cost of the 
failure and would have been liable for any related harms (for example, if the rocket had caused 
harm after exploding and falling to earth). Similarly, when liability is disclaimed by 
organizations, as it often is in the provisioning of software and AI tools, an agent using that 
software may have no control over how the software behaves, yet be unable to hold the creator of 
that software liable, let alone responsible. 
 
Accountability as Normative Fidelity 
The most abstract way that the term “accountability” is used connects the answerability 
relationship to broader norms, values, and fundamental rights. That is, when a system should 
uphold a particular political, social, or legal norm or be held to some moral standard, that 
requirement is often couched in terms of accountability in the sense of moral responsibility.29 For 
example, Bovens, Schillemans, and Goodin observe that, in politics, “‘[a]ccountability’ is used 
as a synonym for many loosely defined political desiderata, such as good governance, 
transparency, equity, democracy, efficiency, responsiveness, responsibility, and integrity.”30 
Political scientists often wonder whether accountability continues to hold meaning, even when 
operationalizing it is straightforward in the ever-growing number of places where it is claimed as 
desirable.31 
 
And yet, accountability provides an achievable mechanism for approaching otherwise slippery 
and contested normative goals. While it might not be possible to agree on definitions of 
“fairness” or even of “discrimination”, agents and entities are still accountable for their behaviors 
with respect to the operative norms. Although it is noble to pursue computer systems which are 
“moral”, “ethical”, or “fair”, it is not clear how to operationalize this goal or how to tell when it 
has been achieved. However, agents which develop or rely on these tools can be made 
accountable for the outcomes they bring about, enabling judgements about when and how these 
agents are answerable on understandings of when operative norms have been violated. 
 
28 These ideas owe a great debt to Nissenbaum’s work separating accountability and liability in Nissenbaum, Helen. 
“Accountability in a computerized society.” Science and engineering ethics 2, no. 1 (1996): 25-42. 
29 Noorman, Merel "Computing and Moral Responsibility", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
30 Bovens, Mark, Thomas Schillemans, and Robert E. Goodin. "Public accountability." The Oxford handbook of 
public accountability (2014): 1-22. 
31 Mulgan, Richard. "‘Accountability’: An ever‐expanding concept?" Public administration 78, no. 3 (2000): 555-
573. 
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Accountability as a Governance Goal 
This notion of accountability as normative fidelity demonstrates that accountability can serve as 
a governance mechanism. Because accountability is straightforwardly achievable and enables 
judgements about complex and contested values, it is a useful and tractable goal for governance. 
Systems can be designed to meet articulated requirements for accountability, and this enables 
governance within companies, around governmental oversight, and with respect to the public 
trust. Interested parties can verify that systems meet these requirements. This verification 
operates along the same lines that interested parties would use to confirm that any governance is 
operating as intended. Establishing lines of accountability forces a governance process to reckon 
with the values it must protect or promote without needing a complete articulation and 
operationalization of those values. This makes accountability a primary value for which all 
governance structures should strive. 
 
Accountability vs. Transparency 
Accountability is often associated with transparency, the concept that systems and processes 
should be accessible to those affected either through an understanding of their function, through 
input into their structure, or both. For a computer system, this often means disclosure about the 
system’s existence, nature, and scope; scrutiny of its underlying data and reasoning approaches; 
and connection of the operative rules implemented by the system to the governing norms of its 
context.32 Yet transparency is often insufficient and undesirable on its own; it is best 
conceptualized as an instrument for achieving accountability. Understanding and realizing other 
values – such as fairness, privacy, or nondiscrimination – requires shifting the focus from 
transparency to accountability in order to make those values cognizable and to recognize them as 
reified in the system. 
 
For example, a lottery is a perfectly transparent process in the abstract, and yet ensuring that a 
computerized lottery operates faithfully (i.e., picks uniformly from the set of entries a designated 
winner) is an exceptionally difficult and fraught task. Even physical lotteries require elaborate 
ceremonies to demonstrate that all possible numbers have been entered into a physical mixing 
device and sufficiently randomized, without any extra selections becoming possible.33 Although 
the core selection algorithm of a lottery is simple to understand and easy to program correctly, it 
relies on random choices that, by construction, must not be repeatable, making review of a 
lottery outcome intrinsically difficult – because any random choice is as good as any other, 
random values which are predictable to the lottery operator cannot be distinguished from ones 
which are not. Even a correctly implemented software lottery can be run at low cost millions or 
billions of times, creating a set of options from which a preferred winner can be selected ex post. 
The problem of demonstrating that every entry in the lottery was considered on equal footing and 
that no additional illegitimate entries were added is difficult, though feasible to solve with 
modern computer science. Transparency alone is insufficient to ensure that a lottery effects its 
fairly simple goals. Instead, the entire process must make clear that the properties required of its 
outcomes hold, and that violations of those properties will be detectable, to know when the 
actors responsible have deviated from the goal or when the outcome is illegitimate for other 
 
32 Pasquale, Frank. The black box society. Harvard University Press, 2015. 
33 Kroll, Joshua A., Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson, and Harlan Yu. 
“Accountable algorithms.” U. Pa. L. Rev. 165 (2016): 633. 
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reasons and can be held accountable. Similarly, the actors can be praised if the process operates 
faithfully. 
 
Beyond this insufficiency, transparency can be undesirable in certain contexts, leading to 
situations where the subjects of decisions can alter their behavior strategically to violate an 
operative norm. For example, if procedures at a military installation’s guarded gate are always 
the same, an adversary can establish the weaknesses in those procedures and exploit them. To 
prevent this, procedures are often changed regularly. Yet, if an adversary knows which 
procedures will be in effect on which day, they can use that knowledge to attempt to overcome 
the procedures when they are weakest, gaining access to the installation on days when guards are 
most lackadaisical. The same logic applies to employees pilfering cash from a till, to burglars 
approaching their target, or to smugglers crossing a border or other control point. More 
generally, use of some measure as a target for control often leads people to change their behavior 
to maximize their benefit, a phenomenon known as Goodhart’s Law34; for example, when test 
scores are used as a measure of educational achievement and student achievement is the core 
measure of teacher performance, teachers are incentivized to train students to perform well on 
known tests rather than to understand the underlying material, confusing the practices of 
education and training.35 
 
Finally, full transparency often trades off with other values related to confidentiality. Whether 
that is expressed as the personal privacy of individuals affected by a computer system or the 
proprietary intellectual property interests of the system’s creators or operators, the level of 
transparency required for governance often trades off against the disclosure of legitimate secrets. 
For this reason as well, it is best to think in terms of answerability relationships and 
accountability when establishing computer system governance mechanisms. 
 
Mechanisms for Accountability in AI 
Of course, transparency is a useful tool in the governance of computer systems, but mostly 
insofar as it serves accountability. To the extent that targeted, partial transparency helps 
oversight entities, subjects of a computer system’s outputs, and the public at large understand 
and establish key properties of that system, transparency provides value. But there are other 
mechanisms available for building computer systems that support accountability of their creators 
and operators. 
 
First, it is key to understand what interests the desired accountability serves and to establish the 
answerability relationships: what agents are accountable to which other agents (“accountability 
of what?” and “accountability to whom?”), for what outcomes, and to what purpose? Once these 
are established, it is clearer which records must be kept to support interrogation of this 
relationship and to ensure that blame and punishment can be meted out to the appropriate agents 
in the appropriate cases. These records must be retained in a manner that guarantees that they 
relate to the relevant behavior of the computer system, representing the relationship between its 
inputs, its logic, and its outputs faithfully. This can be accomplished with the tools of modern 
 
34 Goodhart, Charles AE. "Problems of monetary management: the UK experience." In Monetary Theory and 
Practice, pp. 91-121. Palgrave, London, 1984. 
35 Espeland, Wendy Nelson, and Michael Sauder. "Rankings and reactivity: How public measures recreate social 
worlds." American journal of sociology 113, no. 1 (2007): 1-40. 
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computer science: cryptography, software verification, and the value type systems of computer 
programming languages. Record fidelity can be maintained across time and space using 
cryptography as well. 
 
Beyond mechanisms that apply specifically to software, however, it is important to consider 
accountability and governance mechanisms that relate desired accountability relationships to the 
process of engineering and design and the function of organizations such as the companies that 
create software artifacts. Such tools include practices that encourage structured reflection on 
needs for an engineered system and how they should be captured in design; rules demanding the 
documentation of requirements and specifications; rules demanding testing and acceptance 
validation to ensure that produced artifacts comport with their documentation; and rules 
demanding documentation for users, operators, and oversight entities. Additionally, 
organizations can structure review processes adversarially, and maintain rules requiring multiple 
authority to effect changes to documentation or code, documenting the change management 
accordingly. Organizations can (and often do) demand that requirements or specifications be 
reviewed by expert teams for security and privacy practices, compliance, and readiness for 
release. Further, organizations can demand (or be required by policy) that their staff produce 
documentation for regulators or the public, such as impact assessments which disclose possible 
adverse effects of the systems being constructed.36 Public documentation serves its function even 
when, and largely because, its creation forces organizations to consider how to develop systems 
which can be presented in the best possible light. Organizations should also ensure that the 
people or functions within the organization which are responsible for particular domains are 
clearly articulated and that these domains of responsibility are documented and widely 
understood. Finally, systems generally arise from a lifecycle, which must truly be a cycle: 
performance of the final system must be measured, evaluated, and considered against initial 
goals for future updates, fixes to the system as deployed, or workarounds for issues not 
immediately addressable. 
 
Consider the Ariane 5 failure in this framework: would thinking in terms of accountability tools 
have prevented the failure? The failure was caused by an explicit decision not to protect numeric 
conversions into certain hardware registers for the sake of efficiency, although this decision had 
been taken for the previous vehicle generation, the Ariane 4 and the code blindly re-used. With 
clearer lines of responsibility for failure, it is likely that additional preflight simulation and 
testing could have been demanded and the problem identified. Further, more careful systems 
engineering would have revealed that allowing a subroutine needed only on the ground to run 
after liftoff was not as harmless as was believed, or at least would have invited more careful 
evaluation of pre-launch processes and the best way to handle momentary launch delay. One 
contemporary author noted of the failure that “Ariane 5 should teach us that there are "political" 
facets of engineering processes. A good process needs to regulate not only how systems are 
designed and developed, but also how high-level decisions about that design and development 
are arrived at.”37 In this light, the fact that no engineering function could be held accountable for 
 
36 Reisman, Dillon, Jason Schultz, Kate Crawford, and Meredith Whittaker. "Algorithmic impact assessments: A 
practical framework for public agency accountability." AI Now Institute (2018). 
37 Dowson, Mark. "The Ariane 5 software failure." ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes 22, no. 2 (1997): 
84. 
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such a massive failure seems hardly surprising, even when the failure can be proximately traced 
to clear errors in the construction of software. 
Whither Accountability in AI? 
Where do these ideas lead us for accountability in AI systems? What ends does accountability 
serve and what are the means to achieving them? Human values are political questions, and 
reflecting them in AI systems is a political act with consequences on the real world. We can (and 
must) connect these consequences to existing political decision-making systems by viewing the 
gap between system behaviors and contextual norms in terms of accountability. For example, if 
we want to know that an AI system is performing “ethically”, we cannot expect to “implement 
ethics in the system” as is often suggested. Rather, we must design the system to be functional in 
context, including contexts of oversight and review. Only then will we be able to establish trust 
in AI systems, leveraging existing infrastructures of trust among people and in institutions to 
new technologies and tools. Thus, the prime focus of building ethical AI systems must be 
building AI into human systems in a way that supports effective accountability for the entire 
assemblage. 
 
While the need for such practices is great, and while it is critical to establish what engineered 
objects are supposed to do, including what is necessary to satisfy articulated accountability 
relationships, the actual reduction to practice of such tools in a way that demonstrably supports 
accountability and other human values remains an important open question for research. While 
many tools and technologies exist, only now are we beginning to understand how to compose 
them to serve accountability and other values. 
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